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Abstract 
The encroachment of protected areas for agricultural and livestock production is an important 
challenge for nature conservation in developing countries. The driving forces of encroachment 
are debated – major arguments focus on (1) the need of local people to cultivate land inside 
protected areas due to poverty, (2) commercial interests of cultivating inside protected areas, 
which indicates free-riding (“greed”), and (3) resistance against protected areas caused by 
disregard of customary rights. The paper contributes to this understanding by analyzing the 
encroachment of a National Park in Sulawesi, Indonesia. The analysis is guided by a 
theoretical framework which acknowledges that most individuals are neither purely altruistic 
nor entirely self-interested. The empirical analysis combines data from a village-level survey 
with information from a satellite image and other spatial data. The following factors had a 
significant influence on the extent of encroachment: (1) population density in the area, which 
is related to needs, (2) the availability of suitable land inside the Park, which indicates 
“temptation”, and (3) the extent of land that was already cultivated before the Park was 
established, which points to customary rights. Community agreements on conservation are 
discussed as a policy approach that can address all three factors. 
JEL classification: O13, Q12, Q57 
1  Introduction 
Protected areas are the major policy instrument for nature conservation. The number of 
protected areas has tripled over the last twenty years. Around 12 % of the earth’s surface is 
now protected, an area that exceeds that under crop production (IUCN, 2003). Nevertheless, 
biological diversity continues to decline at alarming rates, and conservation organizations 
argue both for an expansion of the network of protected areas, and for a better enforcement of 
regulations in already established protected areas.  Both strategies are likely to increase 
conflicts with local communities, who continue to lose income and development opportunities   2
due to restrictions on farming and livestock keeping in protected areas. Major efforts have 
been made to address these conflicts by developing alternative income sources for 
communities living in the vicinity of protected areas, including eco-tourism, and by involving 
them in the management of protected areas. These approaches have been labeled integrated 
development and conservation, community-based wildlife management and  collaborative 
management.  In spite of these efforts, encroachment  of protected areas for agricultural 
production continues to be a major problem. Encroachment can be defined as the illegal use of 
land inside protected areas. In a study on threats to National Parks in ten countries, 
encroachment by agriculture and livestock was identified to be the most important threat 
(IUCN, 1999: 12).  
The driving forces of encroachment are  subject to debate (compare Horowitz 1997). 
Development-oriented organizations emphasize poverty as a major reason for encroachment. 
Conservation organizations point out that encroachment is often carried out by well-connected 
better-off farmers for commercial interests. Advocacy groups for indigenous people call 
attention to the fact that the establishment of protected areas often violates customary rights – 
so that protected areas constitute an encroachment of indigenous lands rather than vice versa. 
The question of what drives encroachment – need, greed, or customary rights - is of high 
importance for the design of appropriate conservation and development strategies. Yet, this 
debate remains based on ideological arguments, rather than empirical evidence. The present 
paper contributes to overcoming this problem by (1) developing a conceptual framework for 
analyzing the driving forces of encroachment, and (2) conducting an empirical analysis for the 
case of a protected area in Sulawesi, Indonesia. 
2  Conceptual Framework 
A conceptual framework that contributes to  resolving  the debate on encroachment has to 
accommodate different behavioural assumptions regarding the question as to how individuals   3
react to state regulations. One the one hand, one may assume that decision-makers – while 
optimizing  –  respect  the  regulations of state and society - an assumption underlying the 
“traditional” homo economics in neo-classical economics. On the other hand, one may assume 
that decision-makers violate regulations if the benefits of doing so outweigh the costs, taking 
the probability of enforcement and risk behaviour into account. Models of the New 
Institutional Economics are based on this assumption of opportunistic behavior. The fact that 
encroachment happens indicates that the first assumption is unrealistic. However, empirical 
studies on deforestation in the tropics show that protected areas do in fact contribute to 
conservation even though enforcement is very low, indicating that the second assumption 
does not completely describe decision-making either.  As IUCN (2003) notes, many 
proclaimed protected areas in developing nations exist more on paper than in practices. Still, 
in a study on land use change in the Brazilian Amazon, Mertens et al. (2002) found that the 
dummy “presence of a reserve” reduced deforestation. Analyzing land use change in Central 
Sulawesi, Maertens (2004) found that a dummy for “location inside the the national park” 
reduced the probability that a plot is cultivated. Simulating the removal of the legal protection 
to the Darién Park in Panama, Nelson et al. (2001) predict an increase in the deforestation of 
the Park area, even though the ability to enforce restrictions was limited by the small number 
of Park personnel. Deininger and Minten (2002) found a significant influence of the 
protection dummy and concluded that protection did reduce the threat of deforestation in 
Mexico, even though it failed to eliminate deforestation altogether. These findings are in line 
with a survey of 93 protected areas in 22 tropical countries, which found that protected areas 
are effective in reducing deforestation (Bruner et al., 2001).  
In light of this empirical evidence, it is useful to presuppose that real world actors are not 
entirely self-seeking, neither are they purely altruistic.  Assuming that most actors occupy 
some middle ground, Zusman (1993) suggested a framework that captures different degrees to   4
which individuals are prepared to deviate from norms in response to “temptations”, i.e., to 
gain material advantage at the expense of violating a  norm.  This framework, which is 
presented in Figure 1 is useful for analysing the encroachment decision, as it captures the 
trade-off between the disutility caused by violating a state regulation with the utility caused by 
the economic benefits derived from encroachment.  
Figure 1 
The x-axis indicates the extent of the departure from the regulation, which can be measured as 
the size of the land illegally cultivated inside a protected area. The y – axis indicates the 
economic benefits derived from this violation of the rule, which can be measured as the net 
benefit derived from agricultural production inside the protected area. The curve can be 
interpreted as an income possibility curve of the household (to be added to other income 
sources of the household). As this income is derived from agricultural production, the 
standard assumptions of agricultural production theory apply, hence the curve displays 
decreasing marginal returns and is influenced by the agro-ecological potential of the 
respective area, the available technology, and input and output prices, which are influenced by 
infrastructure and markets. Assuming a risk-neutral decision-maker,  one can deduct the 
expected costs of enforcement (multiplying the level of fine with the probability of being 
fined) from the income possibility curve. This will shift the curve Y (which  becomes an 
expected income possibility curve) downwards. 
The indifference curves I in Figure 1 capture the trade-off between the utility of the income 
derived from cultivating inside the Park and the disutility arising from violating the 
regulation, i.e. the disutility arising due to conscience rather than fear of enforcement. I1, I2 
and I3 represent three decision-makers who have  different preferences with regard to this 
trade-off. According to standard micro-economic theory, a household will maximize its utility 
at the point of tangency of the income possibility curve Y and the respective indifference   5
curve, which leads to the encroachment levels E1, E2 and E3 (see Zusman, 1993, for a formal 
treatment). The indifference curves may be influenced by factors such as personal ethical 
standards, the extent to which respecting “law and order” is part of the country’s or region’s 
political culture, and the behaviour of local leaders. Creating awareness about the value of 
nature conservation may shift the indifference curve to the left-hand side, thus reducing the 
level of encroachment. Increasing the productivity of agricultural production will lead to an 
upward shift of the income possibility curve Y, thus increasing encroachment. This reflects a 
typical argument formulated by conservation groups against the “integrated conservation and 
development” approach.  In  line with this argument, Maertens et al. (2006) found that 
increased productivity due to improved technologies did  indeed lead to an  expansion  of 
cultivated land and an encroachment of forests in  Central Sulawesi. However, this effect was 
only observed if such technologies were not input and labor intensive.   
The indifference curve I3 depicts a decision-maker, for whom the violation of the norm does 
not incur any disutility. One interpretation for such an indifference curve is that this decision-
maker displays a pure opportunistic behaviour. However, a decision-maker does not consider 
the establishment of the protected area as legitimate may also have an I3 indifference curve. 
While the first case captures the “greed” argument, the second case refers to the “customary 
rights” argument in the encroachment debate mentioned above.  
Figure 1 also shows how the argument that encroachment is driven by poverty, or need, can 
be addressed in this theoretical framework. The income derived from cultivation inside the 
protected area that is required to fulfil the household’s basic needs is indicated by line Ymin. In 
order to fulfil these needs, a household with the difference curve I1 in Figure 1 has to encroach 
the area E1’ in order to fulfil its minimum requirements Ymin. Encroachment is no longer a 
choice  according to the subjective valuation of the utility of income versus the utility of 
adhering to norms. While one can debate the shape of the indifference curves below Ymin (see   6
Nakajima, 1986), a household that needs to violate a regulation in order to the basic needs will 
end up at a lower utility level (indicated by curve I1’). This captures the intuition that it is not 
useful to declare a protected area in locations where the land to be protected is needed to meet 
the households’ basic needs because  other income opportunities are absent.  Rather than 
improving conservation, this will only impose an additional burden (disutility) on those poor 
households that care about the law. 
While it is not possible to observe the indifference curves of the households directly, these 
theoretical considerations make it possible to identify the variables that have to be taken into 
account in an empirical study of encroachment, as explained below. 
3  Research Area and Data 
The data for the empirical analysis was collected in a National Park and its surrounding area 
in Sulawesi, Indonesia. The Park covers an area of 218,000 ha and is characterized by a high 
degree of endemism. The research area comprised the five sub-districts, in which the National 
Park is located. There are 117 villages located in these districts, of which more than half have 
a border with the National Park. Agriculture is the major income source. The dominant crops 
are irrigated paddy and cacao and coffee.  
This study is based on the following two types of data sources: (1) A socio-economic village-
level survey conducted in 80 villages, and (2) the results of a satellite image interpretation and 
other spatial data, including a road map and a digital elevation model. This analysis includes 
those villages that have that have a border with the National Park (46 of the 80 villages). 
The village survey was conducted in 2001 in 80 of the 117 villages in the research region. The 
villages were selected by stratified random sampling. Stratification criteria included distance 
to the National Park, population density and ethnic composition (proportion of immigrants). 
In each of the selected villages, a focus group of villagers was interviewed, using a 
standardized questionnaire. Information on land use in the research area was derived from the   7
interpretation of a LANDSAT image of 2001. The interpretation was supported by ground 
truthing. Land use classes included forest, open forest, water, paddy rice, other annual crops 
(maize, peanuts, upland rice), coconut, coffee & cacao, grassland, reed and settlement.  
As no satisfactory data on village boundaries could be obtained, Thiessen polygons were 
constructed to link the spatial data to the village survey data. As the polygons assign each 
point in space to the nearest village centre, the procedure appears useful with regard to the 
study of land use decisions because, considering transport time and costs, one can assume that 
villagers are more likely to cultivate areas that are located closer to their settlement.  
4  Analysis and Results 
Based on the considerations in Section 2, the area cultivated inside the Park can be considered 
as a function of  
•  the variables that influence the need of households to cultivate inside the Park (push 
factors, related to the considerations on Ymin in Figure 1),  
•  the variables that influence income possibility curves of the households from 
cultivation inside the Park (pull factors, shifting the Y curve in Figures 1 upwards), 
and  
•  the variables that influence the households’ preferences with regard to income and the 
violation of formal norms (indifference curves I in Figure 1).  
Table  1 lists the variables that have been selected to capture these factors empirically and 
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of these variables.  
Table 1, Table 2 
The dependent variable is the total area encroached per village. To avoid problems of 
heteroscedasticity, we used the natural log of this variable in the regression. Since the villages 
differ considerably in size, the village population is included as predictor variable. The 
population density in the district, in which the village is located, was used as an indicator of   8
population pressure. The number of households without land indicates the pressure on the 
Park arising from inequality of land distribution and related poverty. Since non-agricultural 
income sources have a potential to reduce the pressure on the Park, the number of households 
with such income sources was included. 
The availability of land suitable for agriculture outside the Park, and the possibility to expand 
the paddy cultivation outside the Park were included as factors that reduce the pressure on the 
Park. Using the digital elevation model and the road map as data sources, we defined “suitable 
land” as land below a slope of 20 degrees and situated within a distance of less than 3 km to 
the road. Slope also serves as a proxy for soil quality in the research area. 
The availability of suitable land inside the Park, defined according to the same criteria, was 
included as a pull factor. The travel time to the next major market was also included as a pull 
factor, because of its impact on the value of the crops that are marketed. As an indicator of 
traditional land use rights inside the Park, we considered the extent of the area that was 
already cultivated before the Park was established. We did not include variables indicating 
enforcement, such as the presence of a Park Guard, or variables indicating NGO activities to 
promote conservation, because they are likely to be endogenous. 
Table 3 
Table 3 displays the results of the OLS regression.
1  With the exception of the variables 
“suitable land outside the Park” and “village population,” the variables show the expected 
signs. The variable “suitable land inside the Park” and the variable “area cultivated before the 
Park was established” were significant at the 5 % level, and the variable “population pressure 
                                                   
1 According to the F-statistics, we can reject the hypothesis that all variables are zero. The R-square of 0.51 and 
the adjusted R-square of 0.39 appear reasonable considering the comparatively small sample size of 46 
observations in a cross-sectional data set. The highest condition index was 9, which does not indicate a potential 
multicollinearity problem. Casewise diagnostics showed that the highest Cook’s Distance was 0.6, which 
indicates that no individual case had an undue influence on the model. Plotting the standardized predicted values 
against the standardized residuals and performing the Breusch-Pagan test showed that heteroskedasticity was not 
a problem.   9
in the district” was significant at the 10 % level. The standardized beta-values in Table 3 show 
that these three variables also had a comparatively strong influence on the extent of 
cultivation inside the park. The number of landless households also has a comparatively 
strong influence, however the significance level was only 19%. 
5  Discussion and Conclusions 
The empirical results of the regression model indicate that all three factors discussed in the 
theoretical section – needs, opportunities (“greed”) and indigenous rights – play a role for 
encroachment in the  case considered. The three variables with significant influence in the 
regression model were (1) population density in the area, which can be related to needs, 
(2) the availability of suitable land inside the Park, which is an indication of opportunity or 
temptation, and (3) the extent of land that was already cultivated in the present area of the 
Park before the Park was established, which is an indication of customary rights.  
These empirical results suggest that policy efforts to improve the management of protected 
areas have to simultaneously address all three concerns – needs, “greed” and customary rights. 
An important case in point - which has also been highlighted in earlier studies (compare 
Chomitz and Grey; 1996; Cropper et al., 2001), is avoiding the creation of pull factors by 
placing roads close to protected areas – or vice versa – by placing Parks close to roads. Both 
our theoretical considerations and the empirical results suggest that strengthening law 
enforcement without at the same time reducing the need for encroachment created by poverty 
will not be a viable policy option. Agricultural development programs aiming to alleviate 
poverty, however, may also increase the income opportunities from encroachment. An 
approach practiced in the research are to overcome this problem are “Community Agreements 
on Conservation”.  These agreements have been negotiated between NGOs that provide 
development assistance and the village communities, which made a self-commitment not to 
extend the cultivation inside the National Park. Traditional village authorities helped to   10 
enforce these commitments. The success of such approaches will depend on the effectiveness 
of the projects in raising local incomes, especially of the poor. The Community Agreements 
on Conservation are also a promising tool to deal with  the issue of indigenous rights. In 
several villages, the Park Management and the village leadership have signed Community 
Agreements on Conservation that acknowledge the traditional rights of local communities 
inside the Park. The communities agreed not to expand the cultivation inside the Park and to 
contribute to the enforcement of other Park regulations, such as illegal logging. While it is 
still too early to evaluate the effectiveness of these agreements, they constitute a promising 
tool to overcome conflicts between the goals of conservation, poverty alleviation and the 
recognition of customary rights. 
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Source: adapted from Zusmann (1993: 31) 
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Table 1: Variables used in the Empirical Model 
Variable  Indicator  Data source  Exp. 
sign* 
Dependent variable       
Encroachment  Area per village cultivated inside the 
National Park 
Satellite data   
Predictors       
Push factors       
Village population  No. of inhabitants of the village  Village survey  + 
Population pressure in the 
area 
Population density in the district, 
calculated for the area outside the Park 
Village survey  + 
Land availability outside the 
Park 
Area of land outside the Park with less 
than 20 degree slope and less than 3 
km distance to road (in short: suitable 





Possibility to expand 
irrigated land 
Possibility to extend irrigation 
(dummy: yes/no) 
Village survey  - 
Inequality of land 
distribution 
Percent of households without land  Village survey  + 
Alternative income sources  Percentage of villagers with non-
agricultural income 
Village survey  -   14 
Pull factors        
Availability of suitable land 
inside the Park 
area of forest land inside the Park 
(within the Thiessen polygon of the 
village) with slope of less than 20 
degree and less than 3 km distance to 






Market access  Distance of the village to the major 
market 
Road map  - 
Customary rights       
Cultivation of land inside 
Park area before border was 
established 
Area inside the Park reported to be 
cultivated before Park boundary was 
established 
Village survey  + 
* + / - indicates that the variable is expected to increase / decrease the area cultivated inside the Park.   15 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of variables used in the model 
  N  Mean  STD  Min  Max 
Encroachment (ha)  46  76.3  112.5  0.5  524.8 
log Encroachment (ha)  46  1.4  0.7  -0.3  2.7 
Village population (persons)  46  1,168  934  286  4,676 
Population density in district (persons per km
2)  46  41.1  42.1  12.6  124.1 
Suitable land outside Park (ha)  46  1,009  1,055  0  5,053 
Possibility to expand irrigated land (yes=1, no=0)  46  0.4  0.5  0.0  1.0 
Number of landless households   46  23.6  48.6  0.0  230.0 
No. of households with non-agricultural income  46  40.9  56.2  0.0  283.0 
Suitable land inside Park (ha)  46  451  498  0  1,955 
Travel time to Palu (hours)  46  4.6  4.4  0.8  17.1 
Area cultivated before Park was established (ha)  46  33.9  68.9  0.0  427.0 
Table 3: Regression Results 
  B  STD Beta t  Sig.
(Constant)  1.034   0.261  3.957  0.000
Village population  - 5.2 E-06   0.000 -0.007 -0.038  0.970
Population density in district  4.8 E-03 *  0.003 0.290 1.749  0.089
Suitable land outside Park  6.0 E-05   0.000 0.090 0.622  0.538
Possibility to expand irrigated land  -0.188   0.215 -0.134 -0.877  0.386
No. of landless households  3.3 E-03   0.002 0.230 1.340  0.189
No. of households with non-agr. income  - 5.4 E-04   0.002 -0.043 -0.291  0.772
Suitable land inside Park  4.4 E-04 **  0.000 0.314 2.027  0.050
Travel time to Palu  - 2.8 E-02   0.024 -0.173 -1.135  0.264
Area cultivated before Park was established  3.1 E03 **  0.001 0.303 2.436  0.020
      
R-squared:    0.511      
Adjusted R-squared:  0.389      
F      4.180      
Sign.      0.001***      
Durbin-Watson:  2.203      
 